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Putting the Brakes on the Preventive State: 
Challenging Residency Restrictions on Child Sex 
Offenders in Illinois under the Ex Post Facto 
Clause 
Michelle Olson 
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty 
when the Government‘s purposes are beneficent.  Men born to freedom 
are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers.  
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of 
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
1
 
¶1 State laws restricting where convicted sex offenders can legally reside first came 
into common use in the mid-1990s.
2
  Since then, a number of states and municipalities, 
including Illinois, have implemented restrictions prohibiting sex offenders
3
 from living 
within certain distances from schools, parks, and other areas where children gather.
4
  
These prohibited distances range from 500 to 2000 feet,
5
 and often encircle multiple 
entities within a community.  As a result, sex offenders are often severely limited as to 
where they can legally reside.  These laws have forced some offenders to remain in 
prison
6
 or live in makeshift tent cities because there is nowhere else for them to live.
7
  In 
Georgia, for example, state probation officials advised sex offenders to live in a muddy 
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1 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928). 
2
 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a) (1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003(g) (1998); DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 
1112 (1995); FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (1995); GA. CODE § 42-1-13(b) (1996). 
3
 Each state has its own list of crimes that subject an individual to the label of ―sex offender‖ or ―child sex 
offender.‖  In Illinois only child sex offenders are prohibited from living within 500 feet of schools, 
playgrounds, daycares and other areas where individuals under age 18 gather.  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-
9.3(b-5) (2010); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.4(b-5) (2010). 
4
 See generally Chiraag Bains, Next-Generation Sex Offender Statutes: Constitutional Challenges to 
Residency, Work, and Loitering Restrictions, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 483 (2007); Justin H. Boyd, 
Comment, How To Stop A Predator: The Rush To Enact Mandatory Sex Offender Residency Restrictions 
and Why States Should Abstain, 86 OR. L. REV. 219 (2007) (collecting various sex offender laws).  
5
 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE U.S. 139–141 (Sept. 
2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/09/11/no-easy-answers-0 (listing residency laws in 
different states).  
6
 Megan Twohey, St. Leonard Closes Doors to Sex Offenders, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 6, 2009, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-12-06/news/0912050317_1_offenders-halfway-nursing-homes. 
7
 Homeless Georgia Sex Offenders Ordered out of Woods Camp, FOXNEWS.COM, Sept. 29, 2009, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,556300,00.html. 
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camp on the outskirts of the county until they could locate a legally permissible home.
8
  
In Florida, some sex offenders were forced to live under a remote bridge because they 
could not find housing that complied with the county‘s residency law.9  In Illinois, 1000 
sex offenders are currently eligible for parole but the state refuses to release them from 
prison because they cannot secure suitable housing.
10
  These are but some consequences 
of the increasingly strict regulatory scheme confronting sex offenders in the United States 
today.  
¶2 This Comment explores whether a viable challenge to residency restrictions on 
child sex offenders in Illinois exists under the ex post facto clauses of the federal and 
state constitutions.  It also recounts the history of sex offender regulation in Illinois and 
explores the social and political environment that fostered the emergence of residency 
restrictions in the state.  Part I provides a brief overview of the history and purpose of the 
ex post facto clause.  It also highlights the recent resurgence of preventive lawmaking; 
that is, laws that work to prevent crime rather than detect and investigate it, and laws that 
impose direct restraints on the liberty of those considered particularly dangerous by the 
state.  Part II briefly recounts the legislative history of sex offender regulation in Illinois, 
and provides an overview of the political and social realities that shaped the legislative 
debate.  Part III uses recent state court decisions in Illinois, Indiana, and Kentucky to 
evaluate the constitutionality of residency restrictions on child sex offenders in Illinois, 
ultimately arguing that such restrictions violate the ex post facto clauses of the federal 
and state constitutions.  Finally, this Comment concludes by considering the need for 
judicial intervention given the resurgence of the preventive state. 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE AND THE PREVENTIVE STATE 
¶3 Both the U.S. Constitution and the Illinois Constitution contain ex post facto 
clauses that prohibit Congress and the various state legislatures from passing laws that 
impose or increase punishment for criminal acts after those acts are committed.
11
  The 
U.S. Constitution contains not one, but two, explicit ex post facto prohibitions, ―mak[ing] 
clear the Framers' near obsessive concern over the threat of retroactively-designed 
laws.‖12  Alexander Hamilton, for example, considered the ex post facto prohibitions 
contained in the Constitution among the ―greate[st] securities to liberty and 
republicanism.‖13  James Madison claimed that ―ex post facto laws . . . are contrary to the 
first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation.‖14  One 
leading delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Judge Oliver Ellsworth, went 
so far as to say that an explicit Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto legislation 




 John Pain, Miami Sex Offenders Get OK To Live Under a Bridge—Law Makes Housing All But 
Unobtainable, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 7, 2007, at 4.  
10
 Twohey, supra note 6.  
11
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (―No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.‖); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 
(―No state shall enter into any . . . ex post facto Law.‖); IL CONST. art. I, § 16 (―No ex post facto law, or 
law impairing the obligation of contracts or making an irrevocable grant of special privileges or 
immunities, shall be passed.‖). 
12
 Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1261, 1275 (1998). 
13
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 511 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
14
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 282 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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was unnecessary because ―there was no lawyer, no civilian who would not say that ex 
post facto laws were void of themselves.‖15  
¶4 The location of these clauses within the Constitution itself additionally 
demonstrates the importance of the prohibition.  According to scholar Breck McAllister: 
That it was considered necessary to include [two ex post facto clauses] in 
the original Constitution is a commentary upon the importance attributed 
to them by the Framers.  Such matters as freedom of religion, freedom of 
speech, freedom of the press, etc., came later in the first ten amendments 
and then only as restraints upon the federal government.
16
   
The ex post facto provision contained in Article I, Section 10, however, applied directly 
to the states.
17
   
¶5 The language of Illinois‘ ex post facto clause mirrors that of the Federal 
Constitution and Illinois courts interpret the state‘s ex post facto prohibition in lock step 
with the United States Supreme Court‘s interpretation of the Federal Ex Post Facto 
Clauses.
18
  Thus, the same parameters that constrain Congress‘s ability to act also 
constrain the Illinois legislature‘s ability to do the same.      
¶6 The Federal Constitution, however, fails to clearly define the scope of its ex post 
facto prohibitions, making their application difficult at times.  The United States Supreme 
Court first considered what types of laws should be prohibited as ex post facto laws in the 
1798 case of Calder v. Bull.
19
  The Court concluded that the federal ex post facto 
prohibitions applied only to criminal, not civil, laws; and the Court defined four types of 
criminal laws that the Ex Post Facto Clauses were designed to prevent.
20
  These 
categories, which still hold true today, include: 
1st.  Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, 
and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.  
2nd.  Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, 
when committed.  3rd.  Every law that changes the punishment, and 
inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when 
committed.  4th.  Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and 
                                                 
15
 Robert G. Natelson, Statutory Retroactivity: The Founders’ View, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 489, 515 (2003) 
(quoting RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 376 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)). 
16
 Breck P. McAllister, Ex Post Facto Laws in the Supreme Court of the United States, 15 CAL. L. REV. 
269, 269 (1927).   
17
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
18
 Barger v. Peters, 645 N.E.2d 175, 176 (Ill. 1994) (―[T]he drafters of our modern constitution intended the 
Illinois ex post facto clause to do no more than conform to the Federal Constitution's general prohibition on 
the States.  Thus, in construing this State's constitutional provision, we are without a basis to depart from 
the Supreme Court's construction of the Federal ex post facto clause.  And, in fact, this court has long 
interpreted our own constitutional provision in step with Supreme Court pronouncements.‖) (internal 
citation omitted). 
19
 3 U.S. 386 (1798).  
20
 Id. at 390, 399. 
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receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of 
the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.
21
  
¶7 According to McAllister, ―This oft-quoted dictum is a recognition that the phrase 
ex post facto is a technical one, to be filled by the court with an esoteric meaning.‖22   
Today, however, there are three generally accepted reasons for prohibiting ex post facto 
laws.
23
  The first is to provide fair warning of the law‘s effect.24  The second is to ensure 
proper reliance on the law.
25
  And the third is to provide a check on legislative power.
26
   
¶8 This third reason was of particular concern to the Framers because the Framers 
―commonly regarded ex post facto laws . . . as weapons of tyrants and despots used to 
achieve politically motivated results.‖27  By denying Congress and the state legislatures 
the ability to use these weapons, the Framers hoped to limit the abuse of government 
power directed at political enemies.
28
  Additionally, ―[b]y disallowing retroactive 
retributive measures completely, the Framers prevented legislatures from using [these 
measures] against any particular group.‖29   
 The United States Supreme Court has also recognized the importance of the Ex 
Post Facto Clauses in keeping legislative power in check.  Upon considering the types ex 
post facto laws feared by the Framers, the Court observed in Calder that: 
The prohibition against . . . ex post facto laws was introduced for greater 
caution, and very probably arose from the knowledge, that the Parliament 
of Great Britain claimed and exercised a power to pass such laws. . . .  The 
ground for the exercise of such legislative power was this, that the safety 
of the kingdom depended on the death, or other punishment, of the 
offender: as if traitors, when discovered, could be so formidable, or the 
government so insecure!  With very few exceptions, the advocates of such 
laws were stimulated by ambition, or personal resentment, and vindictive 
malice.  To prevent such, and similar, acts of violence and injustice . . . the 
Federal and State Legislatures, were prohibited from passing any bill of 
attainder; or any ex post facto law.
30
 
Both the Framers and the United States Supreme Court, therefore, recognized early on 
the need to limit the legislature‘s power to retroactively punish its citizens.    
¶9 Throughout history, the Federal Ex Post Facto Clauses have served to cabin the 
punitive powers of the state.  For example, the United States Supreme Court has used the 
Ex Post Facto Clause to strike down state legislation requiring teachers, lawyers, 
                                                 
21
 Id. at 390 (emphasis in original). 
22
 McAllister, supra note 16, at 271. 
23
 See Note, Ex Post Facto Limitations on Legislative Power, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1491, 1496–1498 (1975) 
(outlining the theoretical justifications for prohibiting ex post facto laws). 
24
 Id. at 1496.  
25
 Id.  
26
 Id. at 1498. 
27






 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 389 (1798) (emphasis in original omitted). 
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clergymen, and others to take an ―Oath of Loyalty‖ denying allegiance to the 
Confederacy before continuing to work in their chosen profession;
31
 to prohibit states 
from retroactively extending the statute of limitations for past sexual offenses;
32
 and to 
prohibit states from applying revised sentencing guidelines to individuals who committed 
their crimes prior to the guidelines‘ effective date.33  Implicit in these decisions is the 
recognition that it is fundamentally unfair to retroactively punish individuals for their past 
actions, and to do so exceeds the bounds of the punitive state.  
¶10 But today, to use a phrase coined by Carol Steiker, the preventive state, not the 
punitive state, is ―all the rage.‖34  In the preventive state,35 ―the paradigm of 
governmental social control [shifts] from solving and punishing crimes that have been 
committed, to identifying ‗dangerous‘ people and depriving them of their liberty before 
they can do harm.‖36  According to Steiker, the expansion of the preventive state is 
particularly evident in two areas of law.
37
  The first area involves giving the police more 
authority to prevent, as opposed to detect and investigate, crime.  For example, laws that 
allow police to search people without individualized suspicion,
38
 to stop and frisk people 
without probable cause,
39
 or to order suspected gang members to disperse from a loitering 
group.
40
  Another area where the expansion of the preventive state is evident is in the 
emergence of laws that impose direct restraints on the liberty of those considered 
particularly dangerous by the state.  For example, pre-trial detention laws, sex offender 
registration and community notification statutes, and civil commitment laws, which allow 
the indefinite commitment of certain sexual criminals.
41
  In both of these areas of law, the 
traditional role of the state has expanded from that of punisher to that of preventer.  
¶11 The rise of the preventive state is a relatively recent phenomenon.  According to 
Steiker, ―The preventive state became possible only as the [twentieth] century 
progressed, with the invention of modern police forces and total institutions like the 
prison, the mental hospital and the home for juvenile delinquents.‖42  As a result, the 
limits of the preventive state are less defined than those of the punitive state, which the 
Framers actively debated and directly incorporated into the Constitution.
43
  Again, 
according to Steiker: 
                                                 
31
 Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1866). 
32
 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003).  
33
 Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987). 
34
 Carl S. Steiker, Forward: The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 771, 774 
(1998). 
35
 ―State‖ in this context refers to sovereign governmental power, not one of the fifty states.  
36
 Eric Janus, The Preventative State: Terrorists and Sexual Predators: Countering the Threat of a New 
Outsider Jurisprudence, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 576, 576 (2004).  
37
 Steiker, supra note 34, at 774–776. 
38
 See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (upholding a limited protective sweep of a house by police).  
39
 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (upholding the search of a person without probable cause provided 
the police have reasonable suspicion that the person had committed, was committing, or was about to 
commit a crime).  
40
 See Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. 1997) (striking down the City of Chicago‘s gang loitering 
ordinance, which allowed the police to order individuals to disperse if the officer believed the group 
contained at least one gang member, as void for vagueness).  
41
 Steiker, supra note 34, at 775–776. 
42
 Id. at 778. 
43
 Id. 
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At the time of the drafting and ratifying of the Constitution, the dangers of 
the punitive state were well known.  Thus, the Founders were careful to 
include in our foundational text . . . references . . . to particular criminal 
processes and protections in order to cabin appropriately the punitive 




The limits of the punitive state have been explored extensively (if not 
resolved successfully) both by courts and legal commentators. In contrast, 
courts and commentators have had much less to say about the related topic 
of the limits of the state not as punisher (and thus, necessarily as 
investigator and adjudicator of criminal acts) but rather as preventer of 
crime and disorder generally.
45
 
¶12 There are, however, some limits that currently exist on powers of the preventive 
state.  The United States Supreme Court has concluded, for example, that the law may not 
single out one group of people for disfavored treatment based solely on race.
46
  The Court 
has also established a hierarchy of liberty interests, and afforded greater protection to 
those rights considered ―fundamental.‖47  Finally, the Court has instituted a strict set of 
criminal procedures to limit the government‘s ability to deprive suspected criminals of 
privacy and liberty.
48
  As a result, according to Eric Janus, ―[t]he government‘s efforts at 
radical prevention have, in the last half century, [been] met with diminishing success, as 
the courts have erected some important constitutional bulwarks against excessive 
erosions of liberty in the name of prevention.‖49   
¶13 But, recent sex offender laws threaten to undercut this progress.  According to 
Janus, ―by re-introducing and re-legitimizing the concept of the degraded other,‖ recent 
sex offender laws ―rationalize a degraded system of justice, in which the normal 
protections of the Constitution do not apply.‖50  The next section recounts the emergence 
of sex offender laws in Illinois, and considers the rise of the preventive state as it relates 
to sex offender regulation in the state.  
II. SEX OFFENDER REGULATIONS IN ILLINOIS AND THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE   
¶14 The statutory scheme regulating non-institutionalized51 sex offenders in Illinois is 
comprised of three basic components: the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), which 




 Id. at 773–774. 
46










 This Comment discusses only those laws that affect sex offenders once they are released from prison. 
Illinois also has a civil commitment program for sex offenders.  The Sexually Violent Persons Commitment 
Act allows the indefinite civil commitment of those sex offenders considered most likely to re-offend.  725 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/1 (2010). 
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requires convicted sex offenders to register certain personal information with the state;
52
 
the Sex Offender Community Notification Law (SOCNL), which requires the State 
Police to make sex offender information available to the public via the Internet;
53
 and 
Sections 5/11-9.3(b-5) and 5/11-9.4(b-5) of the Illinois Criminal Code (―Illinois‘ 
residency statute‖ or ―Illinois‘ residency law‖), which prohibits child sex offenders from 
residing within 500 feet of schools, playgrounds, child care institutions, daycares and 
facilities providing programs or services directed towards persons under eighteen years of 
age.
54
  SORA and SOCNL apply to all sex offenders,
55
 whereas the Illinois‘ residency 
statute applies only to child sex offenders.
56
   
¶15 A sex offender is an individual who has been convicted57 of at least one of over 
thirty different sex crimes.
58
  Generally, a child sex offender is a sex offender who 
committed his or her sex crime against a person under age eighteen.
59
  Both types of 
                                                 
52
 Sex Offender Registration Act, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1 (2010). 
53
 Sex Offender Community Notification Law, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 152/101 (2010). 
54
 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5) (2010); id. at 5/11-9.4(b-5).   
55
 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2(A)–(C); id. at 152/105. 
56
 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(c)(2.5); id. at 5/11-9.4(d)(2.5). 
57
 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2(B).  An individual is required to register as a sex offender if he or she is 
found not guilty by reason of insanity of a registerable offense; is the subject of a finding not resulting in an 
acquittal of a registerable offense; is convicted or adjudicated for a violation of federal law, the law of 
another state, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or a foreign country law that is substantially equivalent 
to a registerable offense; is a juvenile adjudicated delinquent for any registerable offense; or is an 
individual adjudicated as being sexually dangerous or sexually violent.  Id. 
58
 Id. at 150/2(B)–(C).  A felony or misdemeanor conviction of any of the following offenses requires 
registration as a sex offender: child pornography, aggravated child pornography, indecent solicitation of a 
child, sexual exploitation of a child, custodial sexual misconduct, sexual misconduct with a person with a 
disability, soliciting for a juvenile prostitute, patronizing a juvenile prostitute, keeping a place of juvenile 
prostitution, juvenile pimping, exploitation of a child, grooming, traveling to meet a minor, criminal sexual 
assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, criminal sexual 
abuse, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, or ritualized abuse of a child; or kidnapping, aggravated 
kidnapping, unlawful restraint, or aggravated unlawful restraint when the victim is a person under eighteen 
years of age and the defendant is not a parent of the victim and the offense was sexually motivated as 
defined in Section 10 of the Sex Offender Management Board Act and the offense was committed on or 
after January 1, 1996; or first degree murder when the victim was under eighteen years of age and the 
defendant was at least seventeen years of age at the time of the offense, and the offense was sexually 
motivated as defined in Section 10 of the Sex Offender Management Board Act; or sexual relations within 
families committed on or after June 1, 1997; or child abduction committed by luring or attempting to lure a 
child under sixteen years of age into a motor vehicle, building, house trailer, or dwelling place without the 
consent of the parent or lawful custodian of the child for other than a lawful purpose, and the offense was 
sexually motivated as defined in Section 10 of the Sex Offender Management Board Act, and the offense 
was committed on or after January 1, 1998; or any of the following offenses if committed on or after July 1, 
1999 and when the victim was under eighteen years of age: forcible detention if the offense was sexually 
motivated as defined in Section 10 of the Sex Offender Management Board Act, solicitation for a 
prostitute, pandering, patronizing a prostitute, or pimping; or the following offenses if committed on or 
after July 1, 1999: indecent solicitation of an adult, or public indecency for a third or subsequent 
conviction; or permitting sexual abuse when the offense was committed on or after August 22, 2002.  Id.  
59
 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(c)(2.5); id. at 5/11-9.4(d)(2.5).  Under Illinois‘ residency statute, a child 
sex offender is an individual convicted of any of the following: child luring, aiding or abetting child 
abduction, indecent solicitation of a child, indecent solicitation of an adult, soliciting for a juvenile 
prostitute, keeping a place of juvenile prostitution, patronizing a juvenile prostitute, juvenile pimping, 
exploitation of a child, child pornography, aggravated child pornography, predatory criminal sexual assault 
of a child, ritualized abuse of a child; or a violation of any one of the following when the victim is under 
eighteen years of age: criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse, or 
aggravated criminal sexual abuse; or a violation of any one of the following when the victim is under age 
eighteen years of age and the defendant is not a parent of the victim: kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, 
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offenders must register with local police, but, as discussed below, only child sex 
offenders are restricted as to where they may legally reside.  
A. Sex Offender Registration 
¶16 The first component of Illinois‘ regulatory scheme was introduced and adopted in 
1986.  The Habitual Child Sex Offender Registration Act (HCSORA) required ―habitual‖ 
child sex offenders to register with police within thirty days of their release from prison 
and remain registered for ten years.
60
  Only four sexual offenses warranted registration 
under HCSORA,
61
 and registration was required only after the conviction of a second or 
subsequent offense.
62
  Failure to register with police was a Class A misdemeanor,
63
 
punishable by less than one year in prison and up to $1000 in fines.
64
   
¶17 As indicated by the HCSORA floor debate, lawmakers believed sex offenders 
posed a serious threat to the community.  According to the bill‘s chief sponsor, State 
Representative Terry Parke, HCSORA was one of the most important laws the legislature 
would consider that year.
65
  ―[W]e are having an epidemic in Illinois . . . [of] sex crimes 
against our children,‖ claimed Representative Parke.66  ―We must remember that 
pedophiles are compulsive and repetitive,‖ echoed State Representative Robert Regan, 
―[t]hey have never been cured.‖ 67 
¶18 Although HCSORA received strong support in both Houses, some lawmakers were 
concerned about the liberty interests at stake.  State Representative Larry Hicks claimed it 
was ―wrong‖ to ―tell criminals once they‘ve been rehabilitated and have served their 
time, that we‘re going to then register them and try to brand them for years to come.‖68  
State Representative Anthony Young similarly cautioned: 
I understand what a sensitive area this is, but at the same time I think this 
House would be establishing a precedent that would be extremely 
dangerous—the precedent being making someone who has served their 
                                                                                                                                                 
unlawful restraint, or aggravated unlawful restraint.  Id. at 5/11-9.3(c)(2.5); id. at 5/11-9.4(d)(2.5). 
60
 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 221, 223, 227 (1987).   
61
 Id. at para. 222 § 2(B).  Registerable offenses included: criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal 
sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse when the offense was a felony.  
62
 Id. at para. 222 § 2(A).  Specifically, a ―habitual child sex offender‖ was any person who, after July 1, 
1986, was convicted a second or subsequent time of any of the sex offenses or attempts to commit any of 
the offenses set forth in the Act.  Multiple convictions resulting from the same act or from offenses 
committed at the same time counted as one conviction under the Act.  
63
 Id. at para. 230 § 10.   
64
 Id. at para. 1005 § 8-3(a)(1); id. at para. 1005 § 8-9-1(a)(2).  
65
 H. Transcription Deb., 84th Gen. Assemb., at 208 (Ill. June 23, 1986). 
66
 Id.  
67
 Id. at 212.  According to Representative Regan, requiring repeat child sex offenders to register with local 
authorities would allow people to know when a sex offender who was going to offend ―again and again and 
again‖ moved into their community.  Id.  Interestingly enough, however, the intent of the bill was not 
community notification.  When pressed by a fellow lawmaker about how the community would know if a 
habitual child sex offender moved into the neighborhood, Representative Parke claimed that community 
notification was ―not the intent of the legislation.‖  Instead, the purpose of the Act was to notify local 
police, not the public, when a habitual child sex offender moved into the area; any ―information [was] to be 
held in confidentiality,‖ and public inspection of registration information was strictly prohibited under the 
Act.  Id.; see also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 229 (stating that public inspection of registration data is 
prohibited, and it is a Class B misdemeanor to permit the unauthorized release of registration information).  
68
 H. Transcription Deb., 84th Gen. Assemb., at 216 (Ill. June 23, 1986).  
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time and paid the price for the crimes they have committed . . . to register 
their name and address . . . I wonder if [this bill] could withstand 
constitutional scrutiny. . . . This is a bad precedent.
69
  
Despite Representative Young‘s concerns, HCSORA easily passed the House,70 
unanimously passed the Senate,
71
 and went into effect on August 15, 1986.
72
  The 
modern era of sex offender registration had begun. 
¶19 The next significant change to Illinois‘ registration statute came six years later 
when the legislature deleted the term ―habitual‖ from HCSORA and required every child 
sex offender to register with local police.
73
  State Representative Frank Mautino proposed 
the change in response to the kidnapping and murder of six-year-old Kahla Lansing, who 
lived in his district in Spring Valley, Illinois.
74
  Representative Mautino‘s bill created the 
Child Sex Offender Registration Act (CSORA), which required those convicted of any 
one of five sexual offenses to register with local police after their first conviction.
75
  It is 
unlikely, however, that CSORA would have prevented Lansing‘s death because her 
attacker did not live in Illinois and therefore would not have been required to register 
with the state.  Lansing‘s attacker was simply passing through Illinois when he kidnapped 
her.
76
   Nevertheless, CSORA passed both chambers unanimously with no debate.
77
  Two 
years later, the legislature amended the law to require that all sex offenders, not just child 
sex offenders, register with local police.
78
  
¶20 In the ensuing years, the Illinois legislature greatly expanded the list of sex offenses 
that warranted registration.  By 2007, according to Ed Yohnka of the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), the list ―ha[d] grown so much . . . it‘s probably an open 
question as to whether it‘s still a useful tool for law enforcement.‖79  Today, over thirty 
different crimes require registration as a sex offender.
80
  The law requires most sex 
offenders to register annually for the ten years following their release, but more violent 
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70
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71
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72
 1986 Ill. Laws 1467 (codified as amended at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1–10 (1994)).  
73
 Child Sex Offender Registration Act, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1–2 (1994).  
74
 S. Transcription Deb., 87th Gen. Assemb., at 52 (Ill. June 18, 1992). 
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 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2(B)(1) (1994).  An individual convicted of any of following offenses was 
required to register as a child sex offender when the victim was under eighteen years of age: criminal 
sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse when the offense was a felony, 
aggravated criminal sexual abuse.  Id. at 150/8; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9.3 (1994). 
76
 People v. Rissley, 651 N.E.2d 133, 137 (Ill. 1995).  Repeat child sex offender Jeffery Rissley confessed 
to and was convicted of Kahla Lansing‘s death.  Rissley was passing through Spring Valley, Illinois on his 
way to Michigan when he lured Lansing into his truck and sexually assaulted her.  Rissley then strangled 
Lansing and abandoned her in a barn in Iowa.  When authorities apprehended Rissley, he admitted to two 
previous sex offense convictions in Texas.  He also admitted to being a pedophile who routinely sought 
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Girl, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 10, 1992, at 5.   
77
 H. Transcription Deb., 87th Gen. Assemb., at 27, 30 (Ill. May 14, 1992); S. Transcription Deb., 87th 
Gen. Assemb., at 52 (Ill. June 18, 1992). 
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 H. Transcription Deb., 89th Gen. Assemb., at 91 (Ill. Feb. 9, 1995) (passing House Bill 204 by a vote of 
113-0); S. Transcription Deb., 89th Gen. Assemb., at 75 (Ill. Mar. 15, 1995) (passing House Bill 204, 
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16, 2007, at C1. 
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offenders are required to register for the duration of their natural lives.
81
  Offenders must 
not only register in those jurisdictions where they live and work, but also where they are 
temporarily domiciled, which includes any place they spend an aggregate of five or more 
days during one calendar year.
82
  Sex offenders must provide local police with the 
following current information: photograph, address, place of employment, employer‘s 
telephone number, school attended, county of conviction, license plate numbers for every 
vehicle registered in the offender‘s name, the offender‘s age at the time of the offense, 
any distinguishing marks on the offender‘s body, all e-mail addresses, instant messaging 
identities, chat room identities, and other Internet communication identities that the 
offender uses or plans to use, all Uniform Resource Locators registered or used by the 
offender, and all blogs and other Internet sites maintained by the offender or to which the 
offender has uploaded any content or posted any messages or information.
83
  Sex 
offenders are also prohibited from using any social networking sites
84
 or serving as 
election judges.
85
  Failure to register with local police is a Class 3 felony,
86
 which is 
punishable by two to five years in prison and up to $25,000 in fines.
87
   
B. Community Notification  
¶21 In 1995 lawmakers passed the second component to Illinois‘ sex offender 
regulatory scheme.
88
  The Child Sex Offender Community Notification Law 
(CSOCNL)
89
 required the Illinois State Police to create and maintain a Statewide Child 
Sex Offender Database and to provide certain public entities—including schools and 
child care facilities—with the name, address, date of birth, and adjudication of every 
registered child sex offender in the state.
90
  The law did not, however, require the State 
Police to make this information available to the general public.
91
  Unlike previous sex 
offender laws, CSOCNL prompted a lively debate in the legislature.   
¶22 Senator Robert Molaro, for example, believed CSOCNL failed to provide a 
comprehensive solution to the problem of sexual abuse in the state.  According to Senator 
Molaro: 
This [bill] isn‘t well thought out . . . If we‘re worried about a child sex 
offender living with us, what about a child murder[er]? . . . What about a 
child kidnapper? Why isn‘t that in the bill? . . . Here we are again 
haphazardly jumping into something because of something that happened 
                                                 
81
 Id. at 150/7.  
82
 Id. at 150/3(a)(1)–(2).  
83
 Id. at 150/3(a). 
84
 Ray Long & Monique Garcia, Law: Sex Offenders’ Web Use is Limited, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 12, 2009, at 13. 
85
 Ray Long, Laws Aim to Keep Sex Offenders from Kids, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 15, 2008, at 2. 
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 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/10(a).  
87
 Id. at 5/5-4.5-40(a); id. at 5/5-4.5-40(e). 
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 1995 Ill. Laws 4453 (codified at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 152/101 (1996)).   
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 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 152/101 (1996).  
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in the newspaper.  We have to be responsible here . . . .  Everybody should 
know when a sex offender comes in.  But we have to be responsible and 
not willy-nilly make bills that make no sense and just throw it out to the 
public and say let the Supreme Court or the police departments figure this 
out.  We should figure it out and we should take the time to do it.
92
  
¶23 State Representative Joel Brunsvold echoed Senator Molaro‘s concerns, claiming 
CSOCNL was ―not ready,‖ and lawmakers were ―rushing to get this thing done.‖93  State 
Representative Coy Pugh added:  
I understand that we all need to justify our existence.  But when we talk 
about justifying our existence based on sacrificing the rights of the masses, 
then we have to rethink our positions or even our conscience . . . .  At what 
point are we going to do not what‘s right for our reelection, not what‘s 
right for the local newspapers, not what‘s right for our Leadership, who 
may or may not know what they are doing? . . .  When are we going to 
base our decisions on the rightness of the matter?
94
 
¶24 Despite the concerns of Representative Pugh and others, CSOCNL passed the 
House by a vote of eighty-eight ayes, eleven nays, and fifteen present;
95
 it passed the 
Senate by a vote of forty-eight ayes, no nays, and seven present.
96
  Shortly thereafter, in 
an attempt to address some of the issues raised by Senator Molaro, the legislature passed 
the Child Sex Offender and Murderer Community Notification Law, which required 
police to notify specific public entities, such as school boards and daycare providers, 
when child murderers, not just child sex offenders, moved into the community.
97
   
¶25 In 1997, the legislature amended CSOCNL to apply to all sex offenders, not just 
child sex offenders.
98
  Finally, in 1999 the legislature required the State Police to make 
certain sex offender registration information available to the general public via the 
Internet.
99
  Illinois‘ Sex Offender Registration Website allows users to search for sex 
offenders by last name, city, zip code, county, compliance status, and crime.
100
  It also 
allows users to map the registered sex offenders living in their community.
101
  As of May 
2010, there were 24,347 registered sex offenders listed on the website.  
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C. Residency Restrictions on Child Sex Offenders 
¶26 Illinois‘ residency statute first went into effect on July 7, 2000.102  Prior to that, 
Illinois law restricted where child sex offenders could loiter, but not where they could 
live.
103
  House Bill 4045, introduced by State Representative George Scully, prohibited 
child sex offenders from residing within 500 feet of schools, playgrounds, child care 
institutions, daycares and facilities providing programs or services directed towards 
persons under eighteen years of age.
104
  While presenting the bill, Representative Scully 
noted that the Chicago Sun Times recently ran a cover story highlighting how Illinois law 
prohibited child sex offenders from loitering, but not from living near a school.
105
  
According to Representative Scully, House Bill 4045 was designed to remedy this 
―anomaly‖ in the law.106  During debate, Representative Scully assured his colleagues 
that the bill was ―quite constitutional and [did] not unreasonably restrict a person from 
residing within our community.‖107  After a limited discussion, House Bill 4045 passed 
the House by a vote of one hundred and ten ayes, no nays, and three present.
108
   
¶27 The Senate debate, however, was more robust.  Senator William Shaw was 
concerned that the bill would prompt child sex offenders to flock to his district in 
Chicago‘s south suburbs due to inadequate housing in the city.109  ―I just don‘t know 
anywhere in Chicago proper that [a child sex offender] could live,‖ claimed Senator 
Shaw.
110
  But the suburbs have ―more open space and . . . schools are farther apart.‖111  
Senator John Cullerton echoed his colleague‘s concern:  
In Chicago, in my district, we have Lake Point Tower . . . two, three 
thousand people [live there] . . . [same with] the John Hancock Building. 
Nobody could live . . . there if they ever had [a child sex offense] 
conviction.  It‘s just not practical . . . .  It‘s tough to vote No on this bill 
[be]cause of what somebody could say . . . .  I‘m going to vote Present, 
because . . . [this bill] needs work.
112
 
¶28 Chief Senate sponsor Senator Patrick O‘Malley came to the bill‘s defense, stating, 
―basically what we‘re saying is that these people will not be allowed to live near places 
where they might be tempted to harm any of our children, whether they be in Chicago, in 
                                                 
102
 2000 Ill. Laws 2051 (codified as amended at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1–10 (2000)).  
103
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 Id. at 60.  
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the suburbs or downstate Illinois.‖113  Senator Edward Petka agreed, claiming the bill was 
―a logical extension of what [the legislature had] done over the past several years in 
putting up protected zones around schools and around parks.‖114 
¶29 Senator James Clyborne, however, believed the bill unfairly applied to offenders 
who lived in their homes before a school or daycare moved into their neighborhood.
115
  
―They have been [in their homes] for ten years, haven‘t bothered anyone.  They‘ve 
registered as sex offenders. [But now] we‘re criminalizing them because [a] school [is] 
built 500 . . . feet from their home.‖  Senator O‘Malley responded, claiming such a result 
was warranted given the high recidivism rate among child sex offenders.
116
  He closed 
the debate by stating: 
[T]his [legislation] is one more statement to [child sex offenders] who are 
predators on our children . . . [to] get out of Illinois . . . .  [R]ecidivism is a 
real problem with these people . . . .  These are people who are, like, in a 
candy shop, and let‘s keep ‗em out of the candy shop ‗cause the candy 
tends to be our children.
117
 
¶30 House Bill 4045 easily passed the Senate by a vote of fifty-three ayes and five 
present.
118
  Governor George Ryan signed the bill into law on July 7, 2000.
119
  At the 
time, only three other states had sex offender residency restrictions in place.
120
 
D. Working out the Kinks  
¶31 Throughout the years, Illinois lawmakers have been united in supporting tough sex 
offender regulations.
121
  This support is likely due in part to strong public disapproval of 
sex offenders.  For example, a 2005 Gallup poll found that sixty-six percent of 
respondents were ―very concerned‖ about child molesters, whereas only fifty-two percent 
of people were as worried about other types of violent crime.
122
  A 1997 Washington 
state survey found that the majority of respondents said they felt safer knowing where 
convicted sex offenders lived.
123
  And a 2004 Alabama survey found that females and 
parents of minor children, two key voting constituencies, were more likely than males 
and non-parents to feel that community notification was important.
124
  According to 
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scholar Jill Levenson, ―[s]ex offenders and sex crimes incite a great deal of fear among 
the general public and as a result, lawmakers have passed a variety of social policies 
designed to protect community members from sexual victimization.‖125 
¶32  In Illinois, sex offenders have become so despised that finding new ways to 
regulate them has, according to one newspaper, become a ―rite of spring‖ for lawmakers 
in the state.
126
  For example, in the latest legislative session alone,
127
 Illinois lawmakers 
passed bills to: retroactively require all sex offenders, including those convicted before 
SORA‘s enactment date, to register with local police;128 ban all child sex offenders from 
entering public parks;
129
 prohibit child sex offenders from operating, managing, being 
employed by or associated with any local fair when children under age eighteen are 
present;
130
 increase the initial registration and renewal fee for sex offenders from $20 and 
$10, respectively, to $100 for each fee individually;
131
 require sex offenders to register 
within three days, not five days, of being temporarily domiciled in one location;
132
 and 
prohibit child sex offenders from operating ice cream trucks, emergency vehicles, and 
rescue vehicles in the state.
133
  
¶33 Because there is little, if any, organized opposition to these and other sex offender 
bills, there has been little political debate about the long-term effects of Illinois‘ 
regulatory scheme.  As State Representative Roger Eddy noted, ―This is a very, very 
politically charged issue . . . and anyone who comes forward with easing penalties on a 
certain type of sex offender becomes an open target the next election.‖134 
¶34 This lack of legislative oversight, however, has led to some absurd results.  For 
example, from 1996–2006 SORA required individuals convicted of kidnapping, 
aggravated kidnapping, unlawful restraint, or aggravated unlawful restraint against 
victims under age eighteen to register as sex offenders if the victim was not the 
perpetrator‘s child.  As a result, some individuals were required to register as sex 
offenders even though they committed no sex crime.  For example, Charles Johnson was 
forced to register as a sex offender after he and four accomplices kidnapped a sixty-year-
old woman and her twenty-month-old granddaughter in an attempt to extort ransom from 
the woman‘s son.135  Johnson pled guilty to armed robbery and aggravated kidnapping, 
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but because he kidnapped a child under eighteen, to whom he was not a parent, he was 
required to register as a sex offender.
136
  Although the Illinois Appellate Court found that 
Johnson‘s motive was not sexual in nature, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the state 
still had a rational basis for requiring Johnson to register as a sex offender.
137
  
Recognizing the possibility that minors kidnapped by a non-parent could be at greater 
risk for sexual assault, the Court held that registration was a reasonable means of 
protecting the public and was constitutional as applied to Johnson.
138
 
¶35 In another case, the Illinois Appellate Court required a minor convicted of 
kidnapping another minor for a joyride to register as a sex offender.
139
  Sixteen-year-old 
Phillip C. was required to register as a sex offender after forcing seventeen-year-old 
Miguel B. into a car at knifepoint and instructing Miguel to give him a ride.
140
  While he 
was driving, Miguel noticed a sheriff‘s car parked on the side of the road and was able to 
escape to safety.
141
  On appeal, the court upheld SORA‘s registration requirements as 
applied to Phillip.
142
  While acknowledging there was ―no evidence that defendant 
sexually assaulted Miguel or that his motivation in kidnapping Miguel was sexual in 
nature,‖ the court believed that ―the legislature could rationally conclude that kidnapers 
of children pose such a threat to sexually assault those children as to warrant their 
inclusion in the sex offender registry.‖143 
¶36 As a result of the bizarre outcomes in these cases and others, the legislature 
amended SORA in 2006 to apply only to ―sexually motivated‖ offenses.144  At the same 
time, lawmakers created a new registry to track and monitor individuals who harm 
children, but whose crimes are not sexual in nature.
145
  The Child Murderer and Violent 
Offender Against Youth Registration Act (VOYRA) requires child murderers and violent 
offenders against youth to register annually with local police for ten years following their 
release.  The State Police also make this information available to public via the 
Internet.
146
   
¶37 VOYRA, however, does not expressly allow previously registered sex offenders to 
transfer onto VOYRA‘s list, even when their crime was non-sexual in nature.147  Instead, 
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the state‘s attorney in the offender‘s county of conviction has the sole discretion to 
approve or deny the offender‘s transfer request.148  As a result, some individuals remain 
registered as sex offenders despite being convicted of non-sexual crimes.
149
  For example, 
a quick search of the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Website in May 2010 found 174 
child murderers registered as sex offenders.  While some of these registrants were also 
convicted of a sexual offense, many were not; demonstrating the lingering results of the 
ill conceived 1996 SORA amendment.   
¶38 Another problem with Illinois‘ residency statute is that, like the rest of Illinois‘ 
regulatory scheme, it is based on the belief that sex offenders re-offend at an unusually 
high rate.  Recent studies, however, do not support this common belief.  For example, a 
2002 United States Department of Justice (DOJ) study, which tracked 272,111 
criminals
150
 in fifteen states, including Illinois, found that 67.5% of participants were 
rearrested for a new criminal offense within the first three years of their release from 
prison; whereas a similar 2003 DOJ study, which tracked 9691 sex offenders in the same 
fifteen states, found that only 5.3% were rearrested for a new sex crime within the first 
three years of their release.
151
 
¶39 The extreme unpopularity of sex offenders has made it difficult to challenge 
Illinois‘ regulatory scheme in the Illinois courts; the Illinois Supreme Court has upheld 
both SORA and SOCNL against constitutional challenge.
152
  The Court, however, has yet 
to consider the constitutionality of residency restrictions on child sex offenders in the 
state.  Part III uses two recent decisions in other states to explore the validity of an ex 
post facto challenge against Illinois‘ residency statute.  It also considers the need for 
judicial action given the resurgence of the preventive state. 
III. EX POST FACTO CHALLENGE TO ILLINOIS‘ RESIDENCY LAW 
¶40 The United States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court have yet to 
consider whether residency restrictions on child sex offenders violate the ex post facto 
clauses of the United States or Illinois Constitutions.  Two of Illinois‘ five appellate 
courts, however, have concluded that residency restrictions do not offend federal or state 
ex post facto prohibitions.
153
  The Illinois decisions are consistent with the overwhelming 
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judicial trend to uphold residency restrictions in other states.
154
  Two recent cases in 
Indiana and Kentucky, however, question this line of reasoning, and may signal a change 
in the judicial approach to residency restrictions.
155
  This section considers the viability of 
an ex post facto challenge to Illinois‘ residency statute, and the highlights the need for 
judicial intervention given the recent resurgence of the preventive state.  
A. Elements of an Ex Post Facto Challenge  
¶41 A statute is a prohibited ex post facto law if it is both retroactive and 
disadvantageous to the defendant.
156
  To fit this criteria, a law must apply to events 
occurring before its enactment,
157
 and it must criminalize an act which was innocent 
when done, increase the punishment for a previously committed offense, or alter the rules 
of evidence by making a conviction easier.
158
  To determine whether a law criminalizes 
an act which was innocent when done, a reviewing court must first decide whether the 
statute in question creates a civil proceeding or a criminal penalty.
159
  If the legislature 
intended to impose punishment, the court‘s inquiry ends; the statute is a prohibited ex 
post facto law.  But, if the legislature intended to create a civil, non-punitive regulation, 
the court will continue its inquiry into the nature of the statute‘s effects.160  Ultimately, 
the court will override the legislature‘s civil intent if ―the statutory scheme is so punitive 
either in purpose or effect as to negate [the state‘s] intention to deem it civil.‖161   
¶42 To determine the nature of a statute‘s effects, a reviewing court will likely analyze 
the five factors emphasized by the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe.
162
  
These factors ask whether the regulation at issue is 1) traditionally regarded as 
punishment; 2) imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; 3) promotes the twin aims 
of punishment; 4) has a rational connection to a non-punitive purpose; and 5) is excessive 
with respect to its intended non-punitive purpose.
163
  None of these factors alone is proof 
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of a punitive effect, but their consideration as a whole helps the court determine whether 
the statute in question is punitive or civil in nature.
164
    
¶43 To date, both Illinois appellate courts to apply the Smith test upheld Illinois‘ 
residency law as creating a civil regulation, not retroactive punishment.
165
  In People v. 
Leroy, the Illinois Fifth Appellate District held that residency restrictions did not violate 
the ex post facto clauses of the United States or Illinois Constitutions as applied to 
Patrick Leroy, a convicted child sex offender found living within 500 feet of a school 
playground in Alton, Illinois.
166
   In People v. Morgan, the Illinois Third Appellate 
District relied on much of the same reasoning used in Leroy to uphold residency 
restrictions as applied to Jeffrey Morgan, a convicted child sex offender found living 
within 500 feet of a school in Rock Island, Illinois.
167
 
¶44 In both cases, the courts ruled that Illinois‘ residency statute created a civil remedy, 
not a criminal penalty, and that the purpose of the law was to protect the general public, 
not to punish child sex offenders for past offenses.
168
  Until recently, most courts to 
consider the issue have come to the same conclusion.
169
  But in June 2009, the Indiana 
Supreme Court held that its state‘s 1000-foot residency restriction, as applied to a 
convicted child sex offender, violated the ex post facto clause of the state constitution.
170
  
Shortly thereafter, in October 2009, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that Kentucky‘s 
1000-foot residency restriction, as applied to a convicted sex offender, violated the ex 
post facto clauses of both the federal and state constitutions.
171
  Using the Illinois, 
Indiana, and Kentucky cases as a guide, this section evaluates the strengths and 
weaknesses of an ex post facto challenge to residency restrictions on child sex offenders 
in Illinois.  
1. Threshold Inquiries for an Ex Post Facto Challenge in Illinois Court 
¶45 A court reviewing the constitutionality of Illinois‘ residency law must make three 
initial determinations before proceeding to consider the five factors articulated in Smith.  
First, the court must determine whether the statute applies retroactively.
172
  Illinois‘ 
residency statute clearly satisfies this requirement because it applies to all convicted child 
sex offenders, regardless of their date of conviction.  Next, the court must consider 
whether the statute disadvantages the defendant by increasing the punishment for a 




 See infra Part III.B.  
166
 Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 782. 
167
 Morgan, 881 N.E.2d at 512. 
168
 Id.; Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 782. 
169
 See, e.g., Weems v. Little Rock Police Dept., 453 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying Arkansas law); 
Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying Iowa law); Doe v. Baker, 2006 WL 905368 (N.D. 
Ga. 2006) (applying Georgia law); Salter v. State, 971 So.2d 31 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007); Boyd v. State, 2006 
WL 25832 (Ala. Crim. Capp. 2006); Lee v. State, 895 So.2d 1038 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (upholding 
residency restriction statutes against ex post facto challenges); Thompson v. State, 603 S.E.2d 233 (Ga. 
2004); Formaro v. Polk County, 773 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 2009); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa 
2005); Hyle v. Porter, 2006 WL 2987735 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).  But see Nasal v. Dover, 862 N.E.2d 571 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2006).  
170
 State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 1154 (Ind. 2009).  
171
 Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 447 (Ky. 2009).  
172
 People v. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d 433, 438 (Ill. 2000). 




  Illinois‘ residency statute also satisfies this requirement 
because it increases the punishment for past sex crimes by prohibiting some offenders 
from residing within 500 feet of areas where they were previously allowed to live based 
solely on their offender status.
174
   
¶46 Finally, a reviewing court must determine whether the legislature intended to 
impose punishment or to enact a civil regulation.
175
  Recall that federal and state ex post 
facto prohibitions apply only to criminal, not civil, laws.  To determine whether the 
legislature intended to create a civil regulation, a reviewing court will consider the 
legislature‘s express and implied intent. 176  The United States Supreme Court affords 
―considerable deference . . . to the intent as the legislature has stated it.‖177  As such, 
―only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has 
been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.‖178  While maintaining a strong 
presumption in favor of constitutionality, a reviewing court will also likely consider the 
statute‘s text, structure, and enforcement procedures to help determine the legislature‘s 
intent.
179
   
¶47 Both Illinois courts to consider the constitutionality of Illinois‘ residency statute 
concluded that Illinois lawmakers intended to create a civil regulation.
180
  According to 
the Leroy court, ―[w]here a legislative restriction is an incident of the state‘s power to 
protect the health and safety of its citizens, the restriction will be considered to evidence 
an intent to exercise that regulatory power, and not a purpose to add to a punishment.‖181  
As a result, the court concluded that ―the intent of the Illinois General Assembly in 
passing [Illinois‘ residency statute] was to create a civil, nonpunitive statutory scheme to 
protect the public rather than to impose a punishment.‖182 
¶48 The Illinois courts, however, paid only cursory attention to the threshold question 
of legislative intent; and both failed to address the statute‘s text, structure, and 
enforcement procedures, three factors other courts have found determinative.
183
  For 
example, in considering the text and structure of Indiana‘s residency statute, the Indiana 
Supreme Court ruled that by omitting a purpose statement and placing Indiana‘s 
residency statute solely within the criminal code, the Indiana legislature created 
ambiguity regarding its civil intent.
184
  The Indiana court also expressed concern that the 
Indiana statute failed to exempt offenders convicted prior to the statute‘s effective date, 
or those who purchased their homes prior to the statute‘s effective date.185  According to 
the Indiana court, ―with a single exception, [Indiana‘s] residency restriction does not 
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appear to include a civil or regulatory component.‖186  The ―single exception‖ cited by 
the court was a provision that allowed some individuals to petition the court ten years 
after their release to be declassified as child sex offenders.
187
  Based largely on this 
exception, the Indiana court ―assum[ed] without deciding‖ that the Indiana legislature 
intended to create a civil regulatory scheme.
188
  
¶49 Similar to Indiana‘s residency statute, Illinois‘ residency statute is located solely 
within the state‘s criminal code and does not contain a purpose statement clarifying the 
legislature‘s intent.189  Although Illinois‘ residency statute does exempt offenders who 
purchased their homes prior to the law‘s effective date, the Illinois law does not contain a 
grandfather clause exempting those convicted of a sex offense before the statute‘s 
enactment date.
190
  Furthermore, unlike the Indiana law, Illinois‘ residency statute does 
not provide a mechanism for offenders to petition the court for declassification as a child 
sex offender—the ―single exception‖ stressed by the Indiana court. 
¶50 In addition to failing to address the statute‘s text and structure, the Illinois courts 
also failed to evaluate the statute‘s enforcement procedures.  Under Illinois‘ residency 
law, a child sex offender found living in a prohibited zone is guilty of a Class 4 felony,
191
 
which is punishable by one to three years in prison and up to $25,000 in fines.
192
  This is 
similar to the penalty facing those who violate Indiana‘s residency law.  Under Indiana‘s 
residency statute, a child sex offender found living in a prohibited zone is guilty of a 
Class D felony,
193
 which is punishable by six months to three years in prison and up to 
$10,000 in fines.
194
  The penalties for violating the Illinois and Indiana statutes, however, 
are greater than the penalty facing those found violating Kentucky‘s residency statute; a 
law which the Kentucky Supreme Court held was the result of a civil legislative intent.
195
  
Under the Kentucky statute, a sex offender found living in a prohibited zone is guilty of a 
Class A misdemeanor for the first offense,
196
 which is punishable by up to one year in 
prison
197
 and up to $500 in fines.
198
  
¶51 Although Illinois‘ residency statute bears many similarities to the Indiana statute, 
which the Indiana court ruled created ambiguity regarding Indiana‘s legislature‘s civil 
intent, both Illinois courts to consider the issue were reluctant to infer a punitive intent 
from a seemingly civil regulation.  This reluctance is likely a result of the United States 
Supreme Court‘s presumption in favor of constitutionality and the need for ―clearest 
proof‖ before overriding the legislature‘s civil intent.199  Even courts that have held 
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residency restrictions violate ex post facto prohibitions have refused to hold that 
lawmakers enacted such restrictions solely as a means of punishing sex offenders.
200
  As 
such, a reviewing court will likely proceed to the next step in the ex post facto analysis, 
which is whether the statute in question is so punitive, either in purpose or effect, as to 
negate the legislature‘s civil intent.201 
2. Historically Regarded as Punishment 
¶52 To determine whether a statute is so punitive so as to overcome the legislature‘s 
civil intent, a reviewing court will likely apply the five factor test articulated in Smith.  
The first Smith factor requires the court to determine whether the restriction at issue has 
been historically regarded as punishment.
202
  According to the United States Supreme 
Court, ―[a] historical survey [is] useful because a State that decides to punish an 
individual is likely to select a means deemed punitive in our tradition.‖203 
¶53 One penalty historically regarded as punishment is banishment.  In United States v. 
Ju Toy, Justice Brewer defined banishment as ―punishment inflicted upon criminals by 
compelling them to quit a city, place, or country, for a specified period of time, or for 
life.‖204  According to Justice Brewer, ―[b]y all the authorities the banishment of a citizen 
is punishment, and punishment of the severest kind.‖205  In the colonial era, court-
sanctioned banishments were believed to deter crime and protect the public.
206
  Illinois, 
however, eventually outlawed the practice, finding it contrary to public policy.
207
 
¶54 In considering the similarities between residency restrictions and banishment, the 
Illinois courts concluded that Illinois‘ residency statute was not akin to the historical 
punishment of banishment because it did not ban offenders from the entire community; it 
simply limited where within the community certain offenders could live.
208
  Unlike 
colonial criminals, child sex offenders are free to move about the community, 
demonstrating the non-punitive nature of the Illinois law according to the court.
209
 
¶55 Residency restrictions, nevertheless, resemble banishment in important ways.  First, 
both penalties severely geographically limit the places where individuals may reside.  For 
example, a study in Oklahoma City, which has a 2000-foot protected zone around 
schools, playgrounds, parks and childcare facilities, found that less than 16% of the city 
was legally inhabitable by sex offenders, and most of that land was industrial and lacked 
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  A recent Colorado study recommended against implementing 
residency restrictions in that state claiming, ―in urban areas, a large number of schools 
and childcare centers are located within various neighborhoods, leaving extremely 
limited areas for sex offenders to reside if restrictions were implemented.‖211  A similar 
study in Orange County, Florida, found that only 5% of the county‘s residential areas 
were outside the prohibited buffer zone.
212
   
¶56 Additionally, both penalties operate to deprive offenders of meaningful connections 
to their communities.  For example, a 2004 survey of Florida sex offenders found that 
half of respondents reported being forced to move from a residence in which they had 
been living due to that state‘s 1000-foot restricted zone around schools, parks, 
playgrounds, public school bus stops, and areas where children congregate.
213
   As the 
mother of a convicted Florida sex offender explained: 
My husband and I wanted [our son] to come live with us for awhile, while 
he got adjusted to life on the outside and got on his feet.  He was not 
allowed to do so because we live within 1,000 feet of a school bus stop.  
So he had to go to a different county, where he had no support system. He 
was placed in a dirty disgusting motel because it was the only place he 
could find to live. It was next door to a XXX nudie place . . . .  He was 
very lonely and depressed . . . .  He eventually started drinking again and 
violated parole by staying out too late.
 214
    
¶57 For this offender, and others like him, residency restrictions pose a significant 
challenge in securing suitable housing.  This challenge also creates a palpable threat to 
the community because sex offenders who cannot find suitable housing become transient 
and difficult to track.  According to one Iowa sheriff, ―We are less safe as a community 
now than we were before residency restrictions‖ because so many offenders have been 
forced into transience by the Iowa law.
215
  Even for non-homeless offenders, residency 
restrictions often push offenders away from the supervision, treatment, stability, and 
supportive networks they need to build successful, law-abiding lives.
216
  In a 2005 survey 
of Florida sex offenders, for example, half of respondents reported that residency 
restrictions prevented them from living with a supportive family member,
217
 and 60% of 
respondents said that residency restrictions created emotional suffering.
218
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¶58 Despite the difficulty many offenders face in finding suitable housing, most courts, 
including those in Illinois, have concluded that residency restrictions are not akin to 
banishment because some, albeit limited, housing is still available to offenders.
219
  The 
Kentucky Supreme Court, however, came to the opposite conclusion, finding that state‘s 
1000-foot restriction prevented offenders ―from residing in large areas of the 
community.‖220  While recognizing that Kentucky‘s residency statute was not identical to 
banishment because it still allowed offenders to visit prohibited areas, the court 
nonetheless found that the law worked to ―expel[] registrants from their own homes, even 
if their residency predated that statute or arrival of the school, daycare, or playground.‖221  
Such a restriction was ―decidedly similar to banishment.‖222 
¶59 Illinois sex offenders face similar challenges in finding suitable housing in the 
state.  Illinois currently imprisons 1000 sex offenders who have met their parole date but 
cannot be released because they are unable to secure suitable housing.
223
    This lack of 
suitable housing is due in part to the fact that Illinois‘ residency statute works in 
conjunction with common preexisting neighborhood designs, which tend to center around 
schools and playgrounds, thereby depriving child sex offenders of housing options.  
Additionally, economic decline in once prosperous Illinois cities, like East St. Louis 
where Patrick Leroy, the defendant in People v. Leroy, lived has led to a scarcity of safe, 
affordable housing for all residents, not just for child sex offenders.
224
  As Judge Kuehn, 
the lone dissenter in Leroy, explained: 
The historical evolution of East St. Louis has resulted in a present-day 
community that possesses a plethora of schools and playgrounds.  At the 
same time, there is a paucity of decent housing. The schools and 
playgrounds are by-products of an economic expansion that East St. Louis 
experienced immediately after the second world war.  Countless factories 
and manufacturing plants provided employment and grew East St. Louis 
into a workingman‘s town . . . .  The Eisenhower years presented a time 
when a lot of East St. Louis children were in need of a lot of schools . . . .  
Over the years that ensued, the manufacturing and production plants 
would disappear, along with the families that once populated the town‘s 
crowded neighborhoods.  Nicely maintained middle-class homes became 
slums, which were condemned and torn down . . . .  Today, remaining 
homes like the one Leroy was ordered to leave tend to cluster around areas 
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 Twohey, supra note 6.  According to Twohey, ―[s]ex offenders have long been prohibited from living in 
households with children under 18 and within 500 feet of a school, park or child-care facility.  A 2005 law 
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in halfway homes licensed by the Department of Corrections or other residential facilities operated by the 
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community with no supervision or transitional support.‖  Id.  The article does not distinguish between child 
sex offenders and other types of sex offenders.    
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where schools still operate . . . .  A number of former school buildings still 
stand, despite their closure.  Their adjoining playgrounds render the 
surrounding neighborhoods off limits to the likes of Patrick Leroy.
225
 
¶60 Despite the housing inadequacies confronting many child sex offenders, the 
majority opinions of both Illinois court decisions failed to consider the impact that 
neighborhood design and economic decline have on the residency options available to 
child sex offenders in the state.
226
  
¶61 Although residency restrictions share some similarities with banishment, the 
Indiana Supreme Court took a different approach in its analysis of the first Smith factor.  
Instead of analogizing Indiana‘s residency law to banishment, the court compared the law 
to other types of restraints typically placed on probationers and parolees.
227
  Because 
restricting where a probationer or parolee may live is a common condition of release, the 
Indiana Supreme Court held that Indiana‘s residency law was akin to a traditional form of 
punishment, namely supervised probation or parole.  According to the court, this factor 




¶62 The success of any legal challenge to Illinois‘ residency law will turn, in part, on 
the living patterns of those in compliance with the law.  Unfortunately, there have been 
no studies analyzing the impact of Illinois‘ residency law on child sex offenders in the 
state.  If offenders face severely limited housing options, which effectively isolate them 
from their communities, then residency restrictions may be akin to the historical 
punishment of banishment.  This is especially true if banishment is understood to mean 
expulsion from part, not all, of a community.  This argument, however, has already been 
rejected by two of Illinois‘ five appellate courts.  Therefore, for a challenge to be 
successful it must either arise in one of the three districts yet to consider the issue or, 
alternatively, it must abandon the analogy to banishment and instead embrace the 
reasoning employed by the Indiana Supreme Court.  
3. Affirmative Disability or Restraint 
¶63 The second Smith factor used to determine whether a particular law is so punitive 
as to negate the legislature‘s civil intent is whether the statute in question imposes an 
affirmative disability or restraint.
229
  Here, a reviewing court must evaluate how the 
statute‘s effects are felt by its subjects.230  If the disability or restraint is minor or indirect, 
the statute is unlikely to be punitive.
231
  In considering the second Smith factor, both 
Illinois courts refused to allow the presence of a limited disability or restraint to sway 
their ultimate conclusion that Illinois‘ residency law created a civil regime.232  Although 
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the Leroy court ―would not characterize the disability or restraint imposed by [Illinois‘ 
residency statute] as minor or indirect,‖ it was ―not convinced that the presence of this 
factor alone [was] sufficient to create a punitive effect from [the legislature‘s] non-
punitive purpose.‖233 
¶64 The dissent in Leroy was ―completely at odds‖ with the majority‘s conclusion, 
especially in light of the legal protections traditionally afforded to one‘s home.234  
According to Judge Kuehn, ―Our history has always placed great emphasis upon, and 
given great deference to, the place where an American chooses to live.  The inalienable 
rights that compose our most cherished values are inextricably tied to an American‘s 
ability to settle, and to live, in a place of his or her choosing.‖235  Illinois residency law 
―does not simply prohibit [convicted child sex offender] Patrick Leroy from living in 
certain areas around this state . . . [it] effectively removes [him] from his lifelong 
residence.‖236  Thus, ―the retroactive disability and restraint imposed by [Illinois‘ 
residency law] . . . directly infringes upon traditionally guarded freedoms and otherwise 
protected personal liberties.‖237  
¶65 Other courts have also held that residency laws impose an affirmative disability or 
restraint on child sex offenders.
238
  The Indiana Supreme Court, for example, found the 
disability or restraint imposed by that state‘s residency law to be ―neither minor nor 
indirect,‖ due, in part, to the statute‘s failure to exempt offenders who established their 
homes prior to a prohibited entity moving into their neighborhood.
239
  According to the 
Indiana court, sex offenders are ―subject to constant eviction because there is no way for 
[them] to find a permanent home in that there are no guarantees a school or youth 
program center will not open within 1000 feet of any given location.‖240  As a result, the 
second Smith factor ―clearly favor[ed]‖ treating the effects of the Indiana‘s residency law 
as punitive as applied to the defendant in the Indiana case.
241
  
¶66 The Kentucky Supreme Court also found it ―difficult to imagine that being 
prohibited from residing within certain areas does not qualify as an affirmative disability 
or restraint.‖242  The Kentucky court was concerned about the ―constant threat of 
eviction‖ and ―collateral consequences‖ facing offenders under Kentucky‘s residency 
law.
243
  According to the court, the Kentucky law ―could, for example, impact where an 
offender‘s children attend school, access to public transportation for employment 
purposes, access to drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs and even access to medical 
care and residential nursing home facilities for the aging offender.‖244  As a result, the 
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court had little difficulty concluding that Kentucky‘s residency law ―clearly impose[d] 
affirmative disabilities and restraints upon registrants.‖245      
¶67 Illinois challengers may have less work to do with this Smith factor because, while 
Illinois courts viewed the restraint imposed by the state‘s residency law as non-punitive, 
they nonetheless recognized that the law does operate as an affirmative disability or 
restraint on child sex offenders.
246
  The challenge then is to convince a reviewing court 
that this factor should be afforded sufficient weight to affect their overall analysis under 
Smith.  
4. Twin Aims of Punishment 
¶68 The third factor a reviewing court will consider to determine whether the effects of 
a law are punitive is whether the statute in question promotes either of the twin aims of 
punishment: retribution or deterrence.
247
  The assumption underlying this Smith factor is 
that if a statute promotes retribution or deterrence, it is more likely punitive than 
regulatory.
248
  Reiterating the statute‘s public safety goals, the Illinois courts rejected the 
possibility that Illinois‘ residency law inflicted retribution for past sex offenses.249  
According to the Leroy court, ―the purpose of [Illinois‘ residency law is to] protect[] 
children from known child sex offenders, and . . . [t]here is no evidence that [the law 
was] designed as a form of retribution.‖250  In considering the deterrent effect of the 
statute, the Leroy court noted that it was ―reasonable‖ to believe that Illinois‘ residency 
law might deter future crimes by limiting the  contact child sex offenders have with 
children, but ―even an obvious deterrent purpose does not necessarily make a law 
punitive.‖251  To hold otherwise, claimed the court, ―would severely undermine the 
government‘s ability to engage in effective regulation.‖252 
¶69 The Leroy court, however, seemed to focus its inquiry on whether the Illinois 
legislature designed Illinois‘ residency statute to inflict retribution or deterrence, not 
whether the application of the statute tends to promote either of the twin aims of 
punishment.  According to Judge Kuehn, one need only examine Patrick Leroy‘s 
circumstances to understand how Illinois‘ residency law advances retribution.253  Leroy 
was convicted in 1987 of criminal sexual assault.
254
  He served six years in prison and 
upon his release returned to his childhood home to live with his aging mother.  Besides 
prison, this was the only home Leroy had ever known.  For over a decade, Leroy lived 
within 500 feet of an elementary school and never re-offended.  In May 2003, authorities 
discovered Leroy was violating of Illinois‘ residency law and forced him to move.  
―Absent a tendency to promote retribution,‖ asked Judge Kuehn, ―what legitimate 
purpose would legislators have in removing Patrick Leroy from his home, given the fact 
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that he has lived there for 10 years without re-offending?‖255  According to Judge Kuehn, 
a restriction, like Illinois‘ residency statute, ―imposed without consideration for the 
likelihood of a particular offender to re-offend has to be grounded, at least in part, in 
furtherance of retribution.‖256  
¶70 The Kentucky Supreme Court was also concerned about the expansive nature of the 
restriction.  According to the court, ―When a restriction is imposed equally upon all 
offenders, with no consideration given to how dangerous any particular registrant may be 
to public safety, that restriction begins to look far more like retribution for past offenses 
than a regulation intended to prevent future ones.‖257  Thus, by failing to make an 
individualized assessment of the dangerousness of each offender, the Kentucky court 




¶71 The Indiana Supreme Court, however, took a different approach, refusing to 
address whether Indiana‘s residency statute promoted retribution and focusing instead on 
the law‘s ―substantial‖ deterrent purpose.259  According to the court: 
By prohibiting sex offenders from living in certain proscribed areas 
[Indiana‘s] residency restriction statute is apparently designed to reduce 
the likelihood of future crimes by depriving the offender of the 
opportunity to commit those crimes.  In this sense the statute is an even 




Thus, according to the Indiana court, the deterrent factor alone favored treating the statute 
as punitive as applied to the offender in the Indiana case.
261
 
¶72 The United States Supreme Court, however, has been hesitant to hold that the 
presence of a deterrent purpose renders an otherwise civil statute punitive.  According to 
the Court, ―Any number of governmental programs might deter crime without imposing 
punishment.  To hold that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such 
sanctions criminal . . . would severely undermine the Government‘s ability to engage in 
effective regulation.‖262  Furthermore, in upholding Alaska‘s sex offender registration 
and community notification law, the Court stated that a ―statute is not deemed punitive 
simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks to 
advance.‖263  As such, ―[t]he State‘s determination to legislate with respect to convicted 
sex offenders as a class, rather than require individual determination of their 
dangerousness, does not make the [Alaska registration and community notification] 
statute a punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause.‖264     
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¶73 Nevertheless, there is a strong argument that Illinois‘ residency statute promotes 
the twin aims of punishment by failing to determine which child sex offenders are likely 
to re-offend.  By subjecting all child sex offenders to the same prohibition, regardless of 
their crime or risk of re-offense, Illinois‘ residency law exacts retribution on those who 
intend to abide by the law.  Additionally, the Illinois law seeks to deter those offenders 
who may re-offend by removing them from areas where children are present.  This 
obvious deterrent effect, however, does not appear to be enough for the United States 
Supreme Court or for the two Illinois courts to consider this issue.  As such, any effective 
challenge to Illinois‘ residency law must rest on more than the third Smith factor alone.        
5. Rational Relationship to a Non-Punitive Purpose 
¶74 The next factor a reviewing court will weigh to determine whether Illinois‘ 
residency law amounts to retroactive punishment is whether the statute bears a rational 
connection to a legitimate non-punitive purpose.
265
  Both Illinois courts to consider the 
issue had little trouble concluding that Illinois‘ residency statute bore a rational 
connection to the legitimate non-punitive purpose of protecting children from known 
child sex offenders.
266
  The Indiana Supreme Court similarly found that its state‘s 
residency statute had ―a purpose other than simply to punish sex offenders,‖ namely to 
advance public safety.
267
  Both statutes, therefore, easily satisfied the fourth Smith factor. 
¶75 The Kentucky Supreme Court focused instead on whether the connection between 
Kentucky‘s residency statute and public safety was indeed rational.268  Noting that the 
statute did little to prohibit offenders from actually interacting with children, it was 
―difficult‖ for the court to see ―how public safety is enhanced by a registrant not being 
allowed to sleep near a school at night, when children are not present, but being allowed 
to stay there during the day, when children are present.‖269  Kentucky‘s residency law did 
nothing to prohibit offenders from working with children, visiting schools and 
playgrounds while children were present, or living with children, including their 
victims.
270
  The Kentucky court therefore concluded that its state‘s statute might bear a 
connection to public safety, but ―the statute‘s inherent flaws prevent that connection from 
being ‗rational.‘‖271 
¶76 Judge Kuehn echoed the Kentucky court‘s conclusion.  According to Judge Kuehn, 
Illinois‘ residency law ―inhibits nothing‖ because child sex offenders can still reside close 
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enough to children to tempt their desires.
272
  Offenders ―can live just outside the 
restricted area, gaze out their kitchen window, and covet the children that they see 
playing on a school playground some 500 feet away.‖273  The arbitrary nature of the 
restriction, coupled with its inability to prohibit offenders from interacting with children, 
made Illinois‘ residency statute ―pointless‖ in the eyes of the Leroy dissent.274 
¶77 Recent studies also indicate that residency restrictions do nothing to prohibit sex 
offenders from re-offending.  For example, a 2005 report to the Florida legislature 
concluded that ―there is no evidence that proximity to schools increases recidivism, or, 
conversely, that housing restrictions reduce re-offending or increase community 
safety.‖275  A 2004 Colorado study, which examined a random sample of sex offenders 
on probation in the Denver area, found that offenders did not cluster in areas where 
children were present, and concluded that residency restrictions ―should not be 
considered as a method to control sexual offending recidivism.‖276  A similar 2003 
Minnesota study found no correlation between the residential location of that state‘s sex 
offenders and their likelihood to re-offend.
277
  According to scholar Asmara Tekle-
Johnson, ―In the face of empirical data evidencing that [residency restrictions] are 
ineffective and grossly over inclusive, the fit between [residency restrictions] and an 
alleged non-punitive purpose of public safety is beyond irrational.‖278    
¶78 Notwithstanding recent empirical data, the rationality factor may be a difficult 
obstacle for those challenging Illinois‘ residency law to overcome.  First, rationality is a 
low standard to meet.
279
  Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court considered the 
fourth Smith factor ―a [m]ost significant‖ element in its determination that the effects of 
Alaska‘s SORA‘s were non-punitive and therefore constitutional under the federal Ex 
Post Facto Clause.
280
  The arguments advanced by the Kentucky Supreme Court,
281
 
therefore, may prove more effective when considered within the context of the final 
Smith factor discussed next.  
6. Excessive in Relation to Non-Punitive Purpose 
¶79 Finally, a restriction may amount to punishment under Smith if it is excessive with 
respect to the state‘s non-punitive purpose.282  A court weighing this factor must 
determine whether the regulatory means are reasonable in light of the state‘s non-punitive 
objective.
283
  In applying the last Smith factor, both Illinois courts concluded that Illinois‘ 
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residency statute set forth a reasonable method by which to promote public safety, and 
the law was not excessive in relation to its non-punitive goal for two reasons.
284
  First, 
when compared to the thirteen other states with residency restrictions at the time, Illinois‘ 
500-foot restriction was the least restrictive in geographical terms.
285
  Additionally, while 
the statute ―restrict[ed] residency to some extent, it [did] not otherwise restrict the 
movement and activities of child sex offenders.‖286  As such, the law bore a reasonable 
relationship to the non-punitive purpose of protecting children from known child sex 
offenders, and set forth a reasonable means by which to accomplish that goal.
287
 
¶80 The Illinois decisions rested on the assumption that restricting sex offenders‘ 
proximity to children would reduce their likelihood to re-offend.  Underlying this 
assumption is the common belief that sex offenders re-offend at an unusually high rate, 
and therefore require special attention to prevent recidivism.
288
  Both assumptions, 
however, are disputed by research.  
¶81 First, studies suggest that sex offenders do not re-offend at an unusually high rate 
and may actually be less likely to re-offend than other criminals.
289
  For example, a 1998 
meta-study of 61 sex offender recidivism studies concluded that, ―[o]n average, the 
sexual offense recidivism rate was low‖ for sex offenders.290  The study found recidivism 
rate for rapists and child molesters, arguably the two most despised sex offender groups, 
was 18.9% and 12.7%, respectively.
291
  Furthermore, regulating where sex offenders may 
legally reside does little to prevent individuals from re-offending.  A 2007 study by the 
Minnesota Department of Corrections, which analyzed the re-offense patters of 224 sex 
offenders released from prison between 1990 and 2002, found that residential proximity 
to children had very little impact on the offender‘s opportunity to re-offend.292  Just over 
half of the recidivists came into contact with their victim through ―social or relationship 
proximity,‖ not by living near the victim or living near places the victim frequents.293  
Additionally, residency restrictions do little to limit the risk posed by family members, 
acquaintances and friends; people who perpetrate an overwhelming majority of sexual 
offenses.
294
  A 2000 DOJ study found that only 7% of child sex victims reported being 
abused by strangers.
295 
 The remaining 93% of victims knew their offenders, 34.2% of 
whom were family members, and 58.7% of whom were acquaintances.
296
 
¶82 Recent research also demonstrates that individualized risk factors can help predict 
which offenders are most likely to re-offend.  For example, a 2004 meta-analysis of 
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ninety-five studies involving more than 31,000 sex offenders found that factors such as 
negative family background, problems with friends and lovers, and deviant sexual 
interests are important predictors of sexual recidivism.
297
  Other research demonstrates 
that dynamic risk factors, such as unemployment, isolation, depression and instability can 
predict the likelihood of re-offense.
298
  The study concluded that ―[i]nterventions directed 
towards the highest risk offenders are most likely to contribute to the public safety.‖299   
¶83 Given the limited effect residency restrictions have on reducing recidivism, 
applying them to all child sex offenders, regardless of risk, seems excessive.  This is 
particularly true considering the indefinite nature of Illinois‘ residency law.  It was this 
lack of individual assessment, in part, that led the Indiana Supreme Court to hold its 
state‘s residency law unconstitutional.300  According to the court, the law failed to 
―consider the seriousness of the crime, the relationship between the victim and the 
offender, or [make] an initial determination of the risk of re-offending.‖ 301  As such, by 
―[r]estricting the residency of offenders . . . without considering whether a particular 
offender is a danger to the general public, the statute exceeds its non-punitive 
purposes.‖302 
¶84 Like Indiana‘s residency statute, Illinois‘ law fails to account for individualized 
risk factors, which can be important predictors of recidivism.  In addition, despite 
applying only to child sex offenders, both the Illinois and Indiana statutes capture 
offenders who have not committed a sex offense against a child.
303
  The Illinois law, for 
example, applies to individuals who commit kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, 
unlawful restraint, and aggravated unlawful restraint, when the victim is under eighteen 
years of age and the defendant is not a parent of the victim.
304
  As previously discussed, 
Illinois‘ SORA contains the same provision, but SORA‘s provision applies only to 
offenses deemed ―sexually motivated.‖305  Illinois‘ residency statute has no such 
provision, applying to sexual and non-sexual crimes alike.  A combination of these 
factors, namely the ineffectiveness of residency restrictions in preventing re-offense, the 
lack of individualized risk assessment, and the broad definition of ―sex offender,‖ 
coupled with the constant threat of eviction, led both the Indiana and Kentucky Supreme 
Courts to conclude that their state‘s respective residency restrictions were excessive when 
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considered in light of their public safety purpose.
306
  Any challenge to Illinois‘ residency 
law, therefore, must emphasize these factors if it hopes to be successful.    
B. Need for Judicial Intervention given the Resurgence of the Preventive State 
¶85 The resurgence of preventive lawmaking in recent years has many observers 
concerned, and with good reason.  Preventive lawmaking not only threatens the liberty 
interests of disfavoured groups, but it also presents a slippery slope with few principled 
limits.  According to Janus, sex offender laws ―provide a template for an expansive 
version of the preventive state‖ by legitimizing outsider jurisprudence.307  Outsider 
jurisprudence is the belief that the state may single out groups of ―others‖ for inferior 
legal treatment.
308
  In the past, the state has attempted to distinguish a group based on the 
physical characteristics of its members—by race, gender, or disability.309  But today, 
modern outsider jurisprudence thrives on the belief that the risky person is different at 
some basic level than the rest of the population; and the new outsider status is based on 
risk of dangerousness, not physical traits.
310
 
¶86 Historically, outsider status has been used to justify everything from slavery, to the 
forced sterilization of ―mental defectives,‖311 to the internment of Japanese Americans 
during World War II.
312
  Once a group is labelled as ―other,‖ and their threat considered 
sufficiently great, there is little to prevent lawmakers from curtailing the civil liberties of 
members.  Thus, one significant problem with the resurgence of outsider jurisprudence, 
according to Janus, is that it ―places no principled limits on the degradation of rights for 
the outside group.‖313 
¶87 More concerning still is the complete lack of political will to resist or question the 
re-emergence of outsider jurisprudence, at least as it pertains to sex offenders.  According 
to The Economist, this lack of political will is not surprising given the political ―ratchet 
effect‖ that accompanies most sex offender laws.  In describing the ―ratchet effect,‖ The 
Economist states that: 
Stricter curbs on paedophiles win votes.  And to sound severe, such curbs 
must be stronger than the laws in place, which in turn were proposed by 
politicians who wished to appear tough themselves.
314
 . . .  [As a result, 
e]very lawmaker who wants to sound tough on sex offenders has to 
propose a law tougher than the one enacted by the last politician who 
wanted to sound tough on sex offenders.
315
 . . .  Few politicians dare to 
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vote against such laws, because if they do, the attack ads practically write 
themselves.
316
        
¶88 Illinois has witnessed its own ―ratchet effect‖ in the twenty-four years since 
HCSORA‘s inception.  During that time, Illinois lawmakers have routinely cited the risk 
of recidivism as one justification for the state‘s increasingly harsh sex offender regulatory 
scheme.  Lawmakers have claimed, for example, that ―recidivism is a real problem with 
these people,‖317 and that sex offenders are ―compulsive and repetitive‖318 and have 
―never been cured.‖319  By using the risk of recidivism as a key marker of ―otherness,‖ 
Illinois lawmakers have not only preyed on the fears of the public, but they have also 
harnessed the legitimacy of science and medicine to reinforce the alleged deviance of the 
outsider group.  According to Janus, ―risk-assessment is seen as an expert endeavour, one 
that is increasingly seen as scientific.‖320   As a result, ―dangerousness serves as a stable 
ingredient of the person . . . [an] internal characteristic . . . that justifies both the 
prediction of future behaviour and the creation of outsider status.‖321  The resulting 
classification, therefore, appears ―natural and inevitable‖ and completely ―untainted by 
the invidious prejudice‖ that in fact drives the classification.322       
¶89 As Part II demonstrated, residency restrictions are simply the latest in a long line of 
preventive measures designed to limit the alleged dangerousness of child sex offenders in 
the state.  Although recent research demonstrates that residency restrictions do little to 
prevent crime
323
 and may actually do more harm than good,
324
 the public‘s strong disdain 
of sex offenders provides little incentive for politicians to change.  Any call for restraint, 
therefore, must originate with the court. 
¶90 To date, however, Illinois courts have been reluctant to overturn Illinois‘ regulatory 
scheme, upholding both SORA and SOCNL against constitutional challenges.  This 
outcome is not surprising given the courts‘ general failure to consider the impact of the 
law within the larger context of the preventive state.  According to Steiker, 
Courts and commentators often tend to conclude, too quickly, that if some 
policy or practice is not ‗really‘ punishment, then there is nothing wrong 
with it . . . .  Not only do courts and commentators often trivialize 
objections to actions of a ‗merely‘ preventive (as opposed to punitive) 
state, they also do not tend to see the various preventive policies and 
practices . . . as part of a unified problem . . . .  Rather, each individual 
preventive practice has been treated as sui generis rather than as a facet of 
a larger question in need of a more general conceptual framework.
325
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¶91 The Illinois courts, however, may soon be faced with an opportunity to re-evaluate 
the legitimacy of the preventive state.  As Part III showed, a viable challenge to Illinois‘ 
residency statute exists under the ex post facto clauses of both the United States and 
Illinois Constitutions.  For the Illinois Supreme Court, and the three Illinois Appellate 
Courts yet to consider the issue, such a challenge provides an opportunity to place a 
principled limit on the power of the preventive state.  Given the laundry list of regulations 
confronting child sex offenders today, any thorough constitutional review of Illinois‘ 
residency statute must consider the proper role of the preventive state.  Namely, to what 
extent should the constitutional limits designed to cabin the powers of the punitive state 
apply to laws aimed at preventing crime? 
¶92 Additionally, the Illinois courts should also consider the underlying purpose of Ex 
Post Facto Clauses.  A close examination of Illinois‘ residency law demonstrates that it 
clearly fails the three policies the Ex Post Facto Clauses were designed to protect.  First, 
by applying to all child sex offenders, regardless of conviction date, Illinois‘ residency 
law deprives offenders convicted prior to the statute‘s effective date of fair warning of the 
law‘s effect.  Additionally, by retroactively changing the penalties associated with certain 
crimes, Illinois‘ residency law frustrates reliance on existing laws in general.  Most 
importantly, Illinois‘ residency law is the result of a largely unchecked political process, 
which has thrived on the perceived ―otherness‖ of an unpopular group.  This political 
―ratchet effect‖ has left child sex offenders with little recourse, and is precisely this type 
of unchecked legislative power that the Ex Post Facto Clauses were designed to prevent. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶93 Residency restrictions are the latest wave in a continuing effort by lawmakers to 
respond to public concern about the presence of sex offenders in the state.  In their rush to 
appease the public, however, lawmakers have failed to consider the long-term impact of 
their chosen regulatory scheme.  The resurgence of preventive lawmaking is cause for 
concern; not only for sex offenders, but for all citizens, because a government without 
principled limits is one of limitless power.  Residency restrictions are not an effective 
means of preventing crime.  More importantly, they violate the basic notions of fairness 
that the Constitution was designed to protect.  Although two of Illinois‘ five appellate 
courts have upheld Illinois‘ residency statute against ex post facto challenges, recent 
decisions in other states may signal a change in the judicial landscape.  The time has 
come for the Illinois Supreme Court to check the powers of the preventive state, and hold 
residency restrictions unconstitutional. 
